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Abstract Modern botnets rely on domain-generation algorithms (DGAs)
to build resilient command-and-control infrastructures. Given the preva-
lence of this mechanism, recent work has focused on the analysis of DNS
traffic to recognize botnets based on their DGAs. While previous work has
concentrated on detection, we focus on supporting intelligence operations.
We propose Phoenix, a mechanism that, in addition to telling DGA- and
non-DGA-generated domains apart using a combination of string and
IP-based features, characterizes the DGAs behind them, and, most impor-
tantly, finds groups of DGA-generated domains that are representative
of the respective botnets. As a result, Phoenix can associate previously
unknown DGA-generated domains to these groups, and produce novel
knowledge about the evolving behavior of each tracked botnet. We evalu-
ated Phoenix on 1,153,516 domains, including DGA-generated domains
from modern, well-known botnets: without supervision, it correctly dis-
tinguished DGA- vs. non-DGA-generated domains in 94.8 percent of
the cases, characterized families of domains that belonged to distinct
DGAs, and helped researchers “on the field” in gathering intelligence on
suspicious domains to identify the correct botnet.
1 Introduction
The malware-as-a-service trend is resulting in an increasing number of small,
distinct botnets, which are predicted to replace larger ones [11]. Because of their
size, they can fly under the radar of malware analysts. Keeping track of such a
diverse population and traffic patterns is difficult. The typical objective of botnet
intelligence is to find the addresses or domain names of the command-and-control
(C&C) server of a botnet, with the goal of sinkholing it.
Albeit some botnets use P2P protocols to remove single points of failure,
domain-generation algorithms (DGAs) are still in wide use. As detailed in §2 and
7, researchers have proposed various approaches for finding and characterizing
individual DGA-generated domains. However, such approaches require visibility
of the original DNS queries, complete with source IP addresses. This requires
low-level DNS sensors to be deployed between the infected machines and their
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DNS servers. This entails privacy issues and restricts operation of such schemes
to network administrators of large networks. In addition, the accuracy of client-
IP-based approaches is affected by IP-sharing mechanisms (e.g., NAT).
A higher-level observation point is beneficial both in terms of ease of de-
ployment and of scope. We propose Phoenix, which requires only publicly
available DNS traffic and an initial feed of malicious domains (not necessarily
DGA-generated). With this information, we (1) find DGA-generated domains,
(2) characterize the generation algorithms, (3) isolate logical groups of domains
that represent the respective botnets, and (4) produce novel knowledge about the
evolving behavior of each tracked botnet. Phoenix requires no prior knowledge of
the DGAs nor reverse engineering of malware samples. Being based on recursive-
level DNS traffic, our approach guarantees repeatability [16] and preserves the
privacy of the infected computers, by not requiring any data about them.
In brief, Phoenix first models pronounceable domains, likely to be generated
by a human user, and considers DGA-generated those which violate the models
(thus, not making use or learning the characteristics of specific DGAs). In
particular, we apply such filter to well-known blacklists of malicious domains,
finding those that are likely to be DGA-generated as well as malicious. Our
technique is unsupervised, and allows to set the amount of acceptable error a
priori (see § 4.1). Phoenix then groups these domains according to the domain-to-
IP relations. This step also filters out DGA-looking domains that are benign (e.g.,
a benign acronym which happens to be unpronounceable). Phoenix then derives
a generic set of fingerprints useful to label new malicious DGA domains, track
botnets’ evolution, or gather insights on their activity (e.g., C&C migrations).
Notably, on Feb 9th 2013 we obtained an undisclosed list of DGA-generated
domains for which no knowledge of the respective botnet was available before.
Phoenix correctly labeled these unknown domains as belonging to Conficker.
2 Background and Research Gaps
While botnets with a fully P2P topology are on the rise, DNS is still abused by
cybercriminals to build centralized, yet reliable botnet infrastructures [2, 3, 8,
14, 15, 21]. An effective technique used to improve resiliency to take downs and
tracking is domain flux. In such botnets, the bots and the C&C servers implement
the same algorithm to generate a large and time-dependent list of domain names
based on pseudo-unpredictable seeds. Only one of these DGA-generated domains
is actually registered and pointing to the true IP address of the C&C. The bots
will then generate and query all these domains, according to the DGA, until a
DNS server answers with a non-NXDOMAIN reply, that is the IP address of
the respective (existing) domain. Only the DGA authors know exactly when the
upcoming rendezvous domain has to be registered and activated, and this avoids
the shortcomings that in past allowed researchers to take over botnets [19].
DGA-based botnets are still prevalent (see, e.g., https://blog.damballa.
com/archives/1906, or http://threatpost.com/pushdo-malware-resurfaces-
with-dga-capabilities). Finding groups of related DGA-generated domains
provides valuable insights to recognize bots that belong to the same botnet, or to a
set of botnets that share a similar DGA. With this knowledge, analysts can follow
their evolution and their (changing) C&Cs over time, where these are hosted, and
the number of machines involved. The task of finding families of related DGA-
generated domains, however, is tedious and labor-intensive, although previous
research has devised mechanisms to partially automate it. Reverse-engineering a
DGA still requires effort and, in most of the cases, a malware sample. In this
work, we show how instances of domains names generated from the same DGA
can be generalized to “fingerprint” the generation algorithm itself.
A side effect of DGA mechanisms is that each infected machine performs a large
amount of DNS queries that yield NXDOMAIN replies. Legitimate hosts have
no reasons to generate high volumes of such queries. This observation has been
leveraged by Antonakakis et al. [3] to detect DGA-based bots. Unfortunately,
as also noticed by Perdisci et al. [15], this criterion requires to know the IP
addresses of the querying hosts. An alternative technique is proposed in [20],
who grouped together DNS queries originated by the same client to define the
correlation between distinct requests that target the same domains.
These approaches are very interesting to detect infected clients over a large
network over which the analyst has full control. However, they impose undesirable
requirements in terms of input data and deployment to create a large-scale
observatory and intelligence service. First, relying on the IP addresses of querying
hosts is error prone, because of IP-(re)assignment and masquerading policies
employed by ASs. More importantly, access to this information is limited in
scope, because it is available only from DNS servers placed below the recursive
DNS level (e.g., host DNSs). This can be problematic for researchers, but also
for practitioners who want to operate these systems beyond the scope of a single
network. Finally, of particular interest for researchers, IP information raises
privacy concerns, leading to non-repeatable experiments [16], as datasets that
include these details cannot be made publicly available.
Modeling and characterizing a DGA from the sole domain name is indeed
hard, in particular when observing one domain at a time, because one sample is
not representative of the whole random generation process. Grouping domain
samples to extract the characteristics of the DGA is also challenging: How to
group domains together, or avoid spurious samples that would bias the results?
3 System Overview
Phoenix is divided into three modules, as shown in Fig. 1. The core Discovery
module identifies and models DGA-generated domains. The Detection module
receives one or more domain names with the corresponding DNS traffic, and uses
the models built by the Discovery module to tell whether such domain names
appear to be automatically generated. If that is the case, this module labels those
domains with an indication of the DGA that is most likely behind the domain
generation process. Last, the Intelligence and Insights module aggregates,
correlates and monitors the results of the previous modules to extract meaningful
Figure 1: The Discovery module processes the domain names from a domain
reputation system and identifies DGA-generated domains. The Detection mod-
ule analyzes a stream of DNS traffic and recognizes the (previously unknown)
domains that resemble a known DGA. The Intelligence and Insights module
provides the analyst with information useful, for instance, to track a botnet.
information from the observed data (e.g., whether an unknown DGA-based botnet
is migrating across ASs).
3.1 Discovery Module
This module discovers domains that exhibit DGA characteristics. It receives two
input streams. One is a stream of domain names that are generically known to
be malicious. Any blacklist or domain reputation system (e.g., Exposure [6]) can
be used as a source. The second input is a stream of DNS queries and replies
related to such domains and collected above the recursive resolvers, for instance
by a passive and privacy-preserving DNS monitor (e.g., SIE). The blacklists that
we rely on are generated from privacy-preserving DNS traffic too.
Step 1 (Filtering). We extract a set of linguistic features from the domain
names. The goal is to recognize the ones that appear to be the results of automatic
generation. For ease of explanation and implementation, Phoenix considers the
linguistic features based on the English language, as discussed in §6.
Differently from previous work, we devised our features to work well on single
domains. Antonakakis et al. [3], Yadav et al. [21, 22], instead, relied on features
extracted from groups of domains, which creates the additional problem of how to
create such groups. The authors circumvented this problem by choosing random
groups of domains. However, there is no rigorous way to verify the validity of
such assumptions. Therefore, as part of our contributions, we made an effort to
design features that require no groupings of domains. We make no assumptions
about the type of DGA that have generated the domains, although we do assume
that at least one exists.
The output is a set of domains, possibly generated by different DGAs. As op-
posed to requiring DGA-generated domains for training, we use a semi-supervised
technique which requires limited knowledge on benign, non-DGA-generated
domains. The rationale is that obtaining a dataset of these domains is straight-
forward and not lto a specific DGA. At runtime, in case Step 1 lets some benign,
DGA-looking domains through (e.g., <ZIP>.com), Step 2 will remove them.
Step 2 (Clustering). We extract IP-based features from the DNS traffic of the
domains that have passed Step 1. We use these features to cluster together
the domains that have resolved to similar sets of IP addresses—possibly, the
C&C servers. For example, if 5ybdiv.cn and hy093.cn resolved to the same
pool of IPs, we cluster them together. Here, we assume that domains generated
by different DGAs are used by distinct botnets/variants, or at least by different
botmasters, who have crafted a DGA for their C&C strategy. Therefore, this
partitioning to some extent mirrors the different groups of botnets.
Step 3 (Fingerprinting). We extract other features from the clusters to create
models that define the fingerprints of the respective DGAs. The Detection
module uses these fingerprints as a lookup index to identify the DGA to which
domains never seen before belong. For instance, epu.org and xmsyt.cn will
match two distinct fingerprints. The notion of similarity is by no means based
solely on linguistic similarity: We do consider other IP- and DNS-based features.
The output is a set of clusters with their fingerprints.
3.2 Detection Module
This module receives in input a (previously unseen) domain name d, which can
be either malicious or benign, and uses once again the Filtering step to verify
whether it is automatically generated. Domain names that pass this filter undergo
further checks, which may eventually flag them as not belonging to any cluster
(i.e., not matching any of the fingerprints). Therefore, in this step, flagging as
“DGA generated” a (benign) domain that does not belong to some DGA is not a
major error. It is instead more important not to discard suspicious domains, in
order to maximize the recall. Therefore, for this module only, we configure the
Filtering step with looser parameters (as described in §4.1), so that we do not
discard any domains that may be automatically generated. Then, this module
leverages the cluster fingerprints to characterize the DGA, if any, that lies behind
the previously unseen domain, d.
3.3 Intelligence and Insights Module
The outcome of previous modules builds novel knowledge, by creating clusters
of related domains, by fingerprinting their underlying DGA, and by associating
new domains to such clusters. With this knowledge, the addresses of the C&C
servers and lists of DGA-generated domains can be easily grouped together and
associated. With this information, analysts can track separately the evolution of
the IPs that the groups point to, and use this information to take action. For
example, recognizing when a C&C is migrated to a new AS is easier when the
set of IPs and domains is small and the characteristics of the DGA are known
and uniform.
Generally speaking, these analyses can lead to high-level intelligence obser-
vations and conjectures, useful for the mitigation of DGA-related threats, for
which we provided two use cases in §5.4. In this, we advance the state of the art
by providing a tool that goes beyond blacklists and domain reputation systems.
4 System Details
We implemented Phoenix in Python using the NumPy package, for statistical
functions, and the SciPy [9] package, for handling sparse matrices. The deployment
is as easy as running a script for each module (§5).
Notation (Domain Names and Suffixes) For the purpose of this work, a domain
name is a sequence of labels separated by dots (e.g., www.example.com) containing
a chosen prefix (e.g., example) and a public suffix (e.g., .com, .co.uk). The
public suffix, or top-level domain (TLD), can contain more than one label (e.g.,
.co.uk). The term effective TLD (eTDL) is thus more correct. A domain name
can be organized hierarchically into more subdomains (e.g., www.example.com,
ssh.example.com). We only consider the first level of a chosen prefix: A DGA
that works on further levels makes little sense, as the first level would still be the
single point of failure. Unless clear from the context, we use the terms domain,
chosen prefix, or prefix as synonyms.
4.1 Step 1: Filtering
We assume that domains generated by DGAs exhibit different linguistic features
than domains crafted by humans with benign intentions. Except for the corner
cases discussed in §6, this assumption is reasonable because benign domains have
the primary purpose of being easily remembered and used by human beings,
thus are usually chosen to meet this goal. On the other hand, DGA-generated
domains exhibit a certain degree of linguistic randomness, as numerous samples
of the same randomized algorithm exist.
Linguistic Features. Given a domain d and its prefix p = pd, we extract two
classes of linguistic features to build a 4-element feature vector for each d. Pilot
experiments showed that using multiple features avoids mistakes due to, for
instance, artificial brand names.
LF1: Meaningful Characters Ratio. Models the ratio of characters of the string
p that comprise a meaningful word. Low values indicate automatic algorithms.
Specifically, we split p into n meaningful subwords wi of at least 3 symbols: |wi| ≥
3, leaving out as few symbols as possible: R(d) = R(p) = max(
∑n
i=1 |wi|)/|p|. If
p = facebook, R(p) = (|face|+ |book|)/8 = 1, the prefix is fully composed of
meaningful words, whereas p = pub03str, R(p) = (|pub|)/8 = 0.375.
LF2: n-gram Normality Score. This class of features captures the pronounce-
ability of a domain name. This is a well-studied problem in linguistics, and
can be reduced to quantifying the extent to which a string adheres to the
phonotactics of the (English) language. The more permissible the combina-
tions of phonemes [4, 18], the more pronounceable a word is. Domains with
a low number of such combinations are likely DGA-generated. We calculate
this class of features by extracting the n-grams of p, which are the substrings
of p of length n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and counting their occurrences in the (English)
language dictionary3. If needed, the dictionary can be extended to include
known benign, yet DGA-looking names. The features are thus parametric to n:
Sn(d) = Sn(p) := (
∑
n-gram t in p count(t))/(|p|−n+1), where count(t) are the oc-
currences of the n-gram t in the dictionary. For example, S2(facebook) = fa109 +
ac343 + ce438 + eb29 + bo118 + oo114 + ok45 = 170.8 seems a non-automatically
generated, whereas S2(aawrqv) = aa4 + aw45 + wr17 + rq0 + qv0 = 13.2 seems
automatically generated.
Statistical Linguistic Filter. Phoenix uses LF1-2 to build a feature vector
f(d) = [R(d), S1,2,3(d)]
T . It extracts these features from a dataset of benign,
non-DGA-generated domains (Alexa top 100,000) and calculates their mean
µ =
[
R,S1, S2, S3
]T
and covariance (matrix) C, which respectively represent the
statistical average values of the features and their correlation. Strictly speaking,
the mean defines the centroid of the dataset in the features’ space, whereas the
covariance identifies the shape of the hyperellipsoid around the centroid containing
all the samples. Our filter constructs a confidence interval, with the shape of
such hyperellipsoid, that allows us to separate non-DGA- from DGA-generated
domains with a measurable, statistical error that we can set a priori.
Distance Measurement. To tell whether a previously unseen domain d′ resem-
bles the typical features of a non-DGA-generated domain, the filter measures
the distance between the feature vector f(d′) = x and the centroid. To this end,
we leverage the Mahalanobis distance: dMah(x) =
√
(x− µ)TC−1(x− µ). This
distance has the property of (1) taking into account the correlation between
features—which is significant, because of how the features are defined, and (2)
operating with scale-invariant datasets.
Distance Threshold. A previously unseen domain d′ is considered as DGA-
generated when its feature vector identifies a point that is too distant from the
centroid: dMah(x) > t. To take a proper decision we define the threshold t as
the p-percentile of the distribution of dMah(x), where (1 − p) is the fraction
of non-DGA-generated domains that we allow to confuse as DGA-generated
domains. In this way, we can set the error a priori. As mentioned in §3.2, the
Discovery module employs a strict threshold, t = Λ, whereas the Detection
module requires a looser threshold, t = λ, where λ < Λ.
Threshold Estimation. To estimate proper values for λ and Λ, we compute
dMah(x) for x = f(d),∀d ∈ DHGD, whose distribution is plotted in Fig. 2a
as ECDF. We then set Λ to the 90-percentile and λ to the 70-percentile of
that distribution, as annotated in the figure. Fig. 2b depicts the 99%-variance
preserving 2D projection of the hyperellipsoid associated to DHGD, together with
the confidence interval thresholds calculated as mentioned above.
3 In our implementation we used http://tinyurl.com/top10000en
4.2 Step 2: Clustering
This step receives as input the set of domains d ∈ D that have passed Step 1.
These domains are such that dMah(f(d)) > Λ, which means that d is likely to
be DGA-generated, because they are too far from the centroid.
The goal of this step is to cluster domains according to their similarity. We
define as similar two domains that resolved to “similar” sets of IP addresses.
The rationale is that the botmaster of a DGA-based botnet registers several
domains that, at different points in time, resolve to the same set of IPs (i.e., the
C&C servers). To find similar domains, we represent the domain-to-IP relation
as a bipartite graph, which we convert in a proper data structure that allows us
to apply a spectral clustering algorithm [13]. This returns the groups of similar
domains (i.e., nodes of the graph). In this graph, two sets of node exists: K = |D|
nodes represent the domains, and L = | IPs(D)| nodes represent the IPs. An edge
exists from node d ∈ D to node l ∈ IPs(D) whenever a domain pointed to an IP.
Bipartite Graph Recursive Clustering. To cluster the domain nodes D, we
leverage the DBSCAN clustering algorithm [7].
Data Structure. We encode the bipartite graph as a sparse matrix M ∈ RL×K
with L rows and K columns. Each cell Ml,k holds the weight of an edge k → l in
the bipartite graph, which represents the fact that domain dk resolves to IP l.
The weight encodes the “importance” of this relation. For each IP l in the graph,
the weights Ml,k,∀k = 1, . . . ,K are set to 1|D(l)| , where D(l) ⊂ D is the subset of
domains that point to that IP. This weight encodes the peculiarity of each IP:
The less domains an IP is pointed by, the more characterizing it is.
Domain Similarity. We calculate the matrix S ∈ RK×K , whose cells encode
the similarity between each pair of domains d and d′. We want to consider two
domains as highly similar when they have peculiar IPs in common. Therefore, we
calculate the similarity matrix from the weights, as S = NT ·N ∈ RK×K , where
N is basically M normalized by columns (i.e.,
∑L
l=1Ml,k = 1,∀k = 1,K). This
similarity matrix implements the rationale that we mentioned at the beginning
of this section.
Domain Features and Clustering. We apply the DBSCAN algorithm hierar-
chically. We compute the first normalized eigenvector v from S. At this point,
each domain name dk can be represented by its feature vk, the k-th element
of v, which is fed to the DBSCAN algorithm to produce the set of R clusters
D = {D1, . . . ,DR} at the current recursive step.
Clustering Stop Criterion. We recursively repeat the clustering process on
the newly created clusters until one of the following conditions is verified:
– a cluster of domains D′ ∈ D is too small (e.g., it contains less than 25 domains
at the first split) thus it is excluded from the final result;
– a cluster of domains has its M matrix with all the elements greater than
zero, meaning that the bipartite graph it represents is strongly connected;
– a cluster of domains cannot be split further by the DBSCAN algorithm with
the value of  set. In our experiments, we set  to a conservative low value of
0.1, so to avoid the generation of clusters that contain domains that are not
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Figure 2: Non-DGA generated domains analysis.
similar. Manually setting this value is possible because  and the DBSCAN
algorithm work on normalized features.
The final output of DBSCAN is D? = {D1, . . . ,DR}. The domains within each
Dr are similar among each other.
Dimensionality Reduction. The clustering algorithm employed has a space
complexity of O(|D|2). To keep the problem feasible we randomly split our
dataset D into I smaller datasets Di, i = 1, . . . , I of approximately the same
size, and cluster each of them independently, where I is the minimum value
such that a space complexity in the order of |Di|2 is affordable. Once each Di
is clustered, we recombine the I clustered sets, D?i = {D1, . . . ,DRi}, onto the
original dataset D. Note that each Di may yield a different number Ri of clusters.
This procedure is very similar to the map-reduce programming paradigm, where
a large computation is parallelized into many computations on smaller partitions
of the original dataset, and the final output is constructed when the intermediate
results become available. We perform the recombination in the following post-
processing phase, which is run anyway, even if we do not need any dimensionality
reduction (i.e., when I = 1, or D1 ≡ D).
Clustering Post Processing. We post process the set of clusters of domains
D?i ,∀i with the following Pruning and Merging procedures. For simplicity,
we set the shorthand notation A ∈ D?i and B ∈ D?j to indicate any two sets
of domains (i.e., clusters) that result from the previous DBSCAN clustering,
possibly with i = j.
Pruning. Clusters of domains that exhibit a nearly one-to-one relation with
the respective IPs are considered unimportant because, by definition, they do
not reflect the concept of DGA-based C&Cs (i.e., many domains, few IPs). Thus,
we filter out the clusters that are flat and show a pattern-free connectivity in
their bipartite domain-IP representation. This allows to remove “noise” from the
dataset. Formally, a cluster A is removed if |IPs(A)||A| > γ, where γ is a threshold
that is derived automatically as discussed in §5.
Merging. Given two independent clusters A and B, they are merged together
if the intersection between their respective sets of IPs is not empty. Formally, A
and B are merged if IPs(A) ∩ IPs(B) 6= ∅. This merging is repeated iteratively,
until every combination of two clusters violates the above condition.
The outcome of the post-processing phase is thus a set of clusters of domains
E = {E1, . . . ,EQ} where each Eq (1) exhibits a domain-to-IP pattern and (2) is
disjointed to any other Ep with respect to its IPs. In conclusion, each cluster E
contains the DGA-generated domains employed by the same botnet backed by
the C&C servers at IP addresses IPs(E).
4.3 Step 3: Fingerprinting
The clusters identified with the previous processing are used to extract fingerprints
of the DGAs that generated them. In other words, the goal of this step is to
extract the invariant properties of a DGA. We use these fingerprints in the
Detection module to assign labels to previously unseen domains, if they belong
to one of the clusters. Given a generic cluster E, corresponding to a given DGA,
we extract the following cluster models:
– CM1: C&C Servers Addresses defined as IPs(E).
– CM2: Length Range captures the length of the shortest and longest domain
names in E.
– CM3: Character Set captures which characters are used during the random
generation of the domain names, defined as C :=
⋃
e∈E charset(pe), where pe
is the chosen prefix of e.
– CM4: Numerical Characters Ratio Range [rm, rM ] captures the ratio
of numerical characters allowed in a given domain. The boundaries are,
respectively, the minimum and the maximum of num(pe)|pe| within E, where
num(pe) is the number of numerical characters in the chosen prefix of e.
– CM5: Public Suffix Set The set of eTDL employed by the domains in E.
To some extent, these models define the aposteriori linguistic features of the
domains found within each cluster E. In other words, they define a model of E.
4.4 Detection Module
This module receives a previously unseen domain d and decides whether it is a
automatically generated by running the Filtering step with a loose threshold
λ. If d is automatically generated, it is matched against the fingerprints of the
known DGAs on the quest for correspondences. In particular, we first select the
candidate clusters {E} that have at least one IP address in common with the IP
addresses that d pointed to: IPs(d) ∩ IPs(E) 6= ∅,∀E. Then, we select a subset
of candidate clusters such that have the same models CM1–5 of d. Specifically,
the length of the chosen prefix of d, its character set, its numerical characters
ratio, and the eTLD of d must lie within the ranges defined above. The clusters
that survive this selection are chosen as the labels of d.
5 Experimental Evaluation
Validating the results of the Phoenix is challenging, because it produces novel
knowledge. Therefore, we first validate the internal components of each module
(e.g., to verify that they do not produce meaningless results and to assess the
sensitivity of the parameters), and then we validate the whole approach using
contextual information, to make sure that it produces useful knowledge with
respect to publicly available information.
5.1 Evaluation Dataset and Setup
The Discovery module of Phoenix requires a feed of recursive DNS traffic
and a reputation system that tells whether a domain is generally considered as
malicious. For the former data source, we obtained access to the SIE framework
(dnsdb.info), which provides DNS traffic data shared by hundreds of different
network operators. We obtained traffic for about 3 months, totaling around 100B
DNS requests and 4.8M distinct domain names. Differently from previous work,
this type of traffic is privacy preserving and very easy to collect. For the latter
data source we used the Exposure [6] blacklist, which included 107, 179 distinct
domains as of October 1st, 2012.
Differently from previous work, we used DGA-generated domains merely as a
ground truth for validation, not for bootstrapping our system before run time.
More precisely, to validate the components of Phoenix we relied on ground
truth generated by publicly available implementations of the DGAs used by
Conficker [10] and Torpig [19], which have been among the earliest and most
widespread botnets that relied on DGAs for C&C communication. Conficker’s
DGA is particularly challenging because it uses non-guessable seeds. With these
DGAs we generated five datasets of domains, which resemble (and in some cases
are equivalent to) the domains generated by the actual botnets: 7500, 7750 and
1,101,500 distinct domains for the Conficker.A, Conficker.B and Conficker.C
malware, respectively, and 420 distinct domains for the Torpig dataset. Moreover,
we collected the list of 36,346 domains that Microsoft claimed in early 2013 to
be related to the activity of Bamital (http://noticeofpleadings.com/). We
used a 4-core machine with 24GB of physical memory. Any experiment required
execution times in the order of the minutes.
5.2 Discovery Validation
Step 1: Filtering. This filter is used in two contexts: by the Discovery module
as a pre-clustering selection to recognize the domains that appear automatically
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generated within a feed of malicious domains, and by the Detection module as
a pre-labeling selection. For pre-clustering, the strict threshold Λ is enforced to
make sure that no DGA-looking domains pass the filter and possibly bias the
clustering, whereas for pre-labeling the loose threshold λ is used to allow more
domains to be labeled. The Labeler will eventually filter out the domains that
resemble no known DGA. We test this component in both the contexts against
the datasets of Conficker, Torpig and Bamital (never seen before).
The filter, which is the same in both the contexts, is best visualized by means of
the ECDF of the Mahalanobis distance. Fig. 3 shows the ECDF from the datasets,
compared to the ECDF from the Alexa top 100,000 domains. The plot shows that
each datasets of DGA and non-DGA domains have different distribution: This
confirms that our linguistic features are well suited to perform the discrimination.
Indeed, the figure shows that each DGA dataset has a distinctive distribution,
thus their DGAs are also different. On the other hand Conficker and Torpig’s
DGAs have similar linguistic characteristics, although not identical. Then, we
verify which fraction of domains passes the filter and reaches the Clustering (Λ)
step or the Labeler (λ). The results obtained are reported in the first column
of the table in Fig. 3 and show that roughly half of the domains would not
contribute to the generation of the clusters: The conservative settings ensure that
only the domains that exhibit the linguistic features more remarkably are used
for clustering. Ultimately, most of the true DGA domains will be labeled as such
before reaching the Labeler. Overall, Phoenix has a recall of 81.4 to 94.8%,
which is remarkable for a non-supervised and completely automatic approach
that requires no training.
In the pre-clustering phase, our system filtered out 34–62% of malicious, yet
non-DGA domains. This ensures that the clusters are not “poisoned” with such
domains, thus creating robust, conservative models.
Cluster 6 (Bamital)
50e7f66b0242e579f8ed4b8b91f33d1a.co.cc
bad61b6267f0e20d08154342ef09f152.co.cc
62446a1af3f85b93f4eef982d07cc492.co.cc
0d1a81ab5bdfac9c8c6f6dd4278d99fb.co.cc
f1dad9a359ba766e9f5ec392426ddd30.co.cc
295e2484bddd43bc43387950a4b5da16.co.cc
501815bd2785f103d22e1becb681aa48.co.cc
341af50eb475d1730bd6734c812a60a1.co.cc
49b24bf574b7389bd8d5ba83baa30891.co.cc
a7e3914a88e3725ddafbbf67444cd6f8.co.cc
Cluster 9 (Palevo via PushDo)
7cj1b.cn ff88567.cn ef44ee.cn
fwjp0.cn 0bc3p.cn 9i230.cn
3dcyp.cn azeifko.cn fyyxqftc.cn
hfju38djfhjdi3kd.cn
Cluster 10 (Palevo via PushDo)
ewn.net wyp.net ews.net kpk.net
khz.net uon.org lxx.net kxc.com
yhv.com nrl.net
Cluster 11 (Conficker)
byuyy.biz jbkxbxublgn.biz
kpqzk.org tcmsrdm.org
lvzqxymji.org fbhwgmb.info
aeyyiujxs.org psaehtmx.info
vdrmgyxq.biz mmdbby.biz
Figure 4: A representative example of a clustering obtained during our evaluation.
Step 2: Clustering. We ran Phoenix on our dataset and, after the first run of
the DBSCAN clustering, we obtained a clustering for which we provide an excerpt
in Fig. 4 (see [17] for full details). We can see that the clusters belonging to each
botnet is profoundly different from a linguistic point of view. Interestingly, the
clustering is not based on IP features, not linguistic features: This confirms that
using linguistic features for first filtering non-DGA domains and then IP-based
features to cluster them lead to clusters that reflect the actual botnet groups.
Reality Check. We searched for contextual information to confirm the usefulness
of the clusters obtained by running Phoenix on our dataset. To this end, we
queried Google for the IP addresses of each cluster to perform manual labeling of
such clusters with evidence about the malware activity found by other researchers.
We gathered evidence about a cluster with 33, 771 domains allegedly used
by Conficker (see also Fig.5 in [17]) and another cluster with 3870 domains
used by Bamital. A smaller cluster of 392 domains was assigned to SpyEye
(distributed through PushDo, https://blog.damballa.com/archives/1998),
and two clusters of 404 and 58 domains, respectively, were assigned to Palevo
(distributed through PushDo). We found no information to label the remaining 6
clusters as related to known malware.
In conclusion, we successfully isolated domains related to botnet activities
and IP addresses hosting C&C servers. From hereinafter we evaluate how well
such isolation performs in general settings (i.e., not on a specific dataset).
Sensitivity From γ. We evaluated the sensitivity of the clustering result to
the γ threshold used for cluster pruning. To this end, we studied the number of
clusters generated with varying values of γ. A steady number of cluster indicates
low sensitivity from this parameter, which is a desirable property. Moreover,
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Figure 5: Clustering sensitivity from parameter γ. By studying the number of
clusters (top) and the average intra-cluster entropy over CF2, 4, 5 (bottom), we
can choose the best γ ∈ (0, 2.8).
abrupt changes of the number of clusters caused by certain values of γ can be
used as a decision boundary to this parameter: Fig. 5 fixes that boundary at
γ = 2.8.
We also assessed how γ influences the quality of the clustering to find safety
bounds of this parameter within which the resulting clusters do not contain
spurious elements. In other words, we want to study the influence of γ on the
cluster models calculated within each cluster. To this end, we consider the cluster
models for which a simple metric can be easily defined: CM2 (Length Range),
CM4 (Numerical Characters Ratio Range) and CM5 (Public Suffix
Set). A clustering quality is high if all the clusters contain domains that are
uniform with respect to these models (e.g., each cluster contain elements with
common public suffix set or length). We quantify such “uniformity” as the entropy
of each model. As Fig. 5 shows, all the models reflect an abrupt change in the
uniformity of the clusters around γ = 2.8, which corroborates the above finding.
In conclusion, values of γ outside (0, 2.8) do not allow the clustering algorithm
to optimally separate clusters of domains.
Correctness. Our claim is that the clustering can distinguish between domains
generated by different DGAs by means of the representative IPs used by such
DGAs (which are likely to be the C&C servers). To confirm this claim in a robust
way, we evaluate the quality of the clustering with respect to features other than
the IP addresses. In this way, we can show that our clustering tells different
DGAs apart, regardless of the IP addresses in common. In other words, we show
that our clustering is independent from the actual IP addresses used by the
botnets but it is capable of recognizing DGAs in general.
To this end, we ignore CM1 and calculate the models CM2-5 of each cluster
and show that they are distributed differently between any two clusters. We
quantify this difference by means of the p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
statistical test, which tells how much two samples (i.e., our CM2-5 calculated
for each couple of clusters) are drawn from two different stochastic processes
(i.e., they belong to two different clusters). p-values toward 1 indicate that two
clusters are not well separated, because they comprise domains that are likely
drawn from the same distribution. On the other hand, p-values close to zero
indicate sharp separation. The results confirm that most of the clusters are well
separated, because their p-value is close to 0. In particular 9 of our 11 clusters are
highly dissimilar, whereas two clusters are not distinguishable from each other
(Clusters 2 and 4). From a manual analysis of these two clusters we can argue
that a common DGA is behind both of them, even if there is no strong evidence
(i.e. DNS features) of this being the case. Cluster 2 include domains such as
46096.com and 04309.com, whereas two samples from Cluster 4 are 88819.com
and 19527.com. The actual p-values obtained in this experiments are detailed
in [17].
5.3 Detection Evaluation
We want to evaluate qualitatively how well the Detection module is able to
assign the correct labels to previously unseen suspicious domains. To this end,
we first run the Discovery module using the historical domain-to-IP relations
extracted from the SIE database for those domains indicated as generically
malicious by the malicious domain filter (which is Exposure blacklist in our
case). Once this module produced the clusters, we validated the outcome of the
Detection against a never-seen-before (random) split of the same type of data.
This means that, given an unseen domain, which matches any cluster model,
Phoenix generates novel knowledge by adding such a domain to the right cluster,
thus effectively assigning a “threat name” to that domain. Domains that do
not match any cluster model are not reported. The quality of the linguistic
features and cluster models clearly affect the false negative rate, because they
are conservative: More relaxed features and cluster models that still maintain a
low degree of false negatives are focus of our ongoing research. The result of the
Detection is a list of previously unseen domains, assigned to a cluster (i.e., a
DGA). Some examples of previously unseen domains are depicted in Fig. 6 along
with some samples of the clusters where they have been assigned to.
These examples show that Phoenix is capable of assigning the correct cluster
to unknown suspicious domains. Indeed, despite the variability of the eTLD,
which is commonly used as anecdotal evidence to discriminate two botnets, our
system correctly models the linguistic features and the domain-to-IP historical
relations and performs a better labeling. In the second case the domains were
registered under .cn and share the same generation mechanism.
5.4 Intelligence and Insights
In this section, we describe two use cases of the Intelligence and Insights
module, which provides the analyst with valuable knowledge from the outputs of
the other modules. The correctness of the conclusions drawn from this module is
Previously unseen domains
hy613.cn 5ybdiv.cn 73it.cn 39yq.cn
69wan.cn hy093.cn 08hhwl.cn hy267.cn
hy673.cn onkx.cn xmsyt.cn fyf123.cn
watdj.cn dhjy6.cn algxy.cn g3pp.cn
Previously unseen domains
dky.com ejm.com eko.com blv.com
efu.com elq.com bqs.com dqu.com
bec.com dpl.com eqy.com dyh.com
dur.com bnq.com ccz.com ekv.com
Cluster 9 (Palevo)
pjrn3.cn 3dcyp.cn x0v7r.cn 0iwzc.cn
0bc3p.cn hdnx0.cn 9q0kv.cn 4qy39.cn
5vm53.cn 7ydzr.cn fyj25.cn m5qwz.cn
qwr7.cn xq4ac.cn ygb55.cn v5pgb.cn
Cluster 10 (Palevo)
uon.org jhg.org eks.org kxc.com
mzo.net zuh.com bwn.org khz.net
zuw.org ldt.org lxx.net epu.org
ntz.com cbv.org iqd.com nrl.net
Figure 6: Labeling of previously unseen domains.
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Figure 7: Bamital (left): Migration of C&C from AS9318 to AS4766. Conficker
(right): Evolution that resembles a C&C takedown: the C&C had 3 IPs in AS0860
and 3 sinkholed IPs in AS2637.
predicated on the correctness of the two upstream modules, already discussed in
prevoius sections.
Unknown DGA Recognition From Scarce Data. Our system is designed
to automatically label the malicious domains related to botnet activities. This is
done by using the information of the DNS traffic related to them. Interestingly,
some conclusions can be drawn on previously unseen domains even in the unlucky
case that such information is missing (i.e., when no DNS data is available).
On Feb 9th, 2013 we received, via a vetted security mailing list, an inquiry by
a group of researchers. They had found a previously unseen list of DGA-generated
domains that resembled no known botnet. Such list was the only information
that they provided us with. Phoenix correctly labeled these domains with the
fingerprints of a Conficker cluster. This allowed the researchers to narrow down
their investigation.
In conclusion, starting from the sole knowledge of a list of malicious domains
that Phoenix had never seen before, we discovered that, according to our datasets,
the only DGA in our dataset able to produce domains with that linguistic features
was the DGA associated with Conficker.
Time Evolution. Associating DGA domains to the activity of a specific botnet
allows to gather further information (e.g., track the botnet evolution) by using
the DGA fingerprints as a “lookup index” to make precise queries.
For instance, given a DGA fingerprint or a sample domain, we can select the
domains of the corresponding cluster EDGA and partition this set at different
granularity (e.g., IPs or ASs) by considering the exact set of IPs (or ASs) that
they point to. Given the activity that we want to monitor, for instance, the DNS
traffic of that botnet, we can then plot one time series for each partition. In our
example, we count the number of DNS requests seen for the domains in that
partition at a certain sampling frequency (e.g., daily). The analysis of the stacked
time series generated allows to draw conclusion about the behavior over time of
the botnet. Fig. 7 shows the case of (a) a migration (the botmaster moved the
C&C servers from one AS to another) followed by (b) a load balancing change in
the final step (the botmaster shut down 2 C&C servers thus reducing the load
balancing).
In a similar vein, Fig. 7 shows an evolution that we may argue being a
takedown operated by security defenders. In particular, at the beginning the
botnet C&C backend was distributed across three ASs in two countries (United
States and Germany). Armed with the knowledge that the IPs in AS2637 and
AS1280 are operated by computer security laboratories, we discover that this
“waterfall” pattern concludes into a sinkhole. Without knowledge of the sinkholed
IPs, we can still argue that the C&C was moved to other ASs.
The aforementioned conclusions were drawn by a semi-automatic analysis and
can be interpreted and used as novel intelligence knowledge. The labels of the
DGAs produced by Phoenix were fundamental to perform this type of analysis.
6 Limitations
Despite the good results, Phoenix has some limitations. Previous work lever-
aged NXDOMAIN responses to identify those DGA-generated domains that the
botmaster did not register yet. This allows early detection of DGA activities,
because the bots yield overwhelming amounts of NXDOMAIN replies. Our sys-
tem, instead, requires registered domains to function. Therefore, it is fed with
data that takes slightly longer collection periods. This results in a less-responsive
detection of previously unseen DGAs. The advantage is that, differently from
previous work, we can fingerprint the DGAs and, more importantly, we lift the
observation point such that Phoenix is easier to adopt. Indeed, we believe that
not using NXDOMAIN replies represents a strength of our work, as it makes
our system profoundly different from previous work in ease of deployment and
testing under less-constraining requirements.
The linguistic features computed on the domain names, to decide whether they
are automatically generated or not, capture the likelihood that a given domain
targets English-speaking users. Taking into account different languages, possibly
featuring totally different sounds like Chinese or Swedish, as well as different
encondings, such as UTF8, would pose some challenges. In particular, computing
language-independent features with a multilingual dictionary would flatten the
underlying distributions, rendering the language features less discriminant. To
tackle this limitation, a possible solution consists in inferring the linguistic target
of a given domain (e.g, via TLD analysis or whois queries) so to evaluate its
randomness according to the correct dictionary.
Future DGAs may attempt to evade our linguistic features by creating pro-
nounceable domains. Besides the fact that, to the best of our knowledge, no such
DGAs exist, creating large amounts of pronounceable domains is difficult: Such
DGAs would have a narrow randomization space, which violates the design goals
of domain flux [10, 19].
7 Related Work
The idea of using linguistic features per se is not novel. However, existing
approaches are based on supervised learning and make assumptions on how
domains should be grouped before processing. Yadav et al. [21, 22] leverage the
randomization of DGA-generated names to distinguish them from non-DGA ones
by means of linguistic features bi-grams computed over domain sets, which are
then classified as sets of DGA- or non-DGA-related. The work explores different
strategies to group domain in sets before feeding them to the classifier. Our work
is different from these approaches because we require no labeled datasets of DGA
domains to be bootstrapped, thus it is able to find sets of DGA domains with no
prior knowledge. Moreover, our system classifies domains one by one, without
the necessity of performing error-prone apriori grouping.
Phoenix differentiates from the approaches that model DGAs as a mean to
detect botnet activity by the type of knowledge that it produces and by the less-
demanding requirements. Perdisci et al. [15] focused on domains that are malicious,
in general, from the viewpoint of the victims of attacks perpetrated through
botnets (e.g., phishing, spam, drive-by download). Moreover, the detection method
of [15] is based on supervised learning. Neugschwandtner et al. [12] proposed a
system that detects malware failover strategies with techniques based on multi-
path exploration. Backup C&C servers and DGA domains are unveiled through
simulated network failures, leading to new blacklists. Although promising, the
approach requires the availability of malware samples. Differently from [12], we
only recursive-level passive DNS traffic.
Phoenix differentiates from the approaches that leverage features of DNS
packets to find new malicious domains by the type of new knowledge inferred
and by the less-demanding learning technique. For example, [6] is a passive
DNS analysis technique to detect domains associated with malicious activities,
including botnet C&C. The main difference is that Phoenix focuses exclusively
on DGAs rather than inferring a domain’s maliciousness. Instead of training a
classifier on malicious domains, we calculate thresholds for our filters based on
benign—or, at least, human-generated—domains. Systems like [6] and [1] rely
on local recursive DNS. Instead, [2] analyzes DNS traffic collected at the upper
DNS hierarchy with new features such as the requester diversity, requester profile
and resolved-IPs reputation. As the authors notice, the approach is ineffective on
DGA-generated domains, because of their short lifespan, whereas we have showed
extensively that Phoenix can detect and, more importantly, label, previously
unknown DGA domains. Bilge et al. [5] proposed DISCLOSURE, a system that
detects C&C communications from NetFlow data analysis. Using NetFlow data
overcomes the problems of large-scale traffic collection and processing. However,
Disclosure discovers domains involved in C&C communications, not necessarily
DGAs.
Other approaches leverage that DGA-based malware yield disproportionately
large numbers of NX responses. Yadav and Reddy [20] extend [22] and introduce
NXDOMAINs to speedup the detection of DGA-generated domains: registered
DGA-generated domains are recognized because they are queried by any given
client after a series of NXDOMAIN responses. The work differs from ours sub-
stantially, mainly because it requires DNS datasets that include the IP addresses
of the querying clients. Moreover, the approach seems fragile on sampled datasets,
which is a required step when dealing with high-traffic networks. To some extent,
our work is complementary to the use of NXDOMAINs, which can be used to
provide early, yet not very explanatory, warnings. Our system compensates for
this lack through the intelligence and insights module.
8 Conclusion
In addition to telling DGA- and non-DGA-generated domains apart using a
combination of linguistic and IP-based features, Phoenix characterizes the
DGAs behind them, and finds groups of DGA-generated domains that are
representative of the respective botnets. As a result, Phoenix can associate
previously unknown DGA-generated domains to these groups, and produce novel
knowledge about the evolving behavior of each tracked botnet. We improve
the linguistic features proposed in previous work and combine them with other
features. We also calculate fingerprints of the domains identified by Phoenix as
belonging to a group of “similar” domains. Contrarily to the existing methods
based on NX domains, our approach does not rely on clients’ IPs, is not affected
by NAT or DHCP, and requires no specific deployment contexts.
We successfully used Phoenix in real-world settings to identify a list of
suspicious domains as belonging to a live botnet (based on Conficker.B). We
believe that, in addition to the comprehensive evaluation, this latter fact proves
Phoenix’s practicality and effectiveness.
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